

International Liberalism—a school of thought that examines, explains, and predicts politics from particular set of values related to good will, morality, and cooperation.

International Liberalism

Rejection of power politics

Focus on international cooperation

Conducting policies of distribution of shared interests

Building security communities

Importance of non-state actors in shaping policy choices

The Liberal vision of some world events.

Selected cases (1913-2008)

From Eric Shiraev & Vlad Zubok. International Relations. NY: McGraw-Hill (forthcoming)

<p>1913-1920. Woodrow Wilson created a set of principles of FP, which brought the US back to assume an active role in the world affairs</p>	<p>He believed that America had a special mission to promote liberty; that democracy was a superior form of government; and the state had no right to maintain a "separate morality" for itself</p>
<p>1988. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev makes a decision to withdraw from East Germany and dismantle the Warsaw Pact</p>	<p>M.G. believed in the possibility to build a multi-polar world in which politics would have been rooted in democracy, cooperation, and good will.</p>
<p>1995. After four years of idling, a group of countries sends troops to stop a civil war in former Yugoslavia (USA, Russia, GB, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, France, Canada, Pakistan, Greece, etc.)</p>	<p>The governments supported by public opinion made a decision based on their collective desire to stop violence and build a viable independent state named Bosnia-Herzegovina.</p>
<p>1990s-2000s Expansion of the European Union based on political and economic integration</p>	<p>Disappearance of state borders and eliminating roots of international conflicts in Western and Central Europe</p>

Idealist and Realist Paradigms Compared.

From: © Shiraev, E. & Zubok, V. *International Relations* (McGraw-Hill, forthcoming)

Idealist-Liberal Tradition	Realist Tradition
International law. Lawful order and stability should be guaranteed by reciprocity, negotiation, and cooperation	Power
Actors. States are not the only capable actors in international affairs.	Sovereign states
Interdependence. Collective security: a broad alliance of major actors can jointly oppose challenges to peace	Independence of sovereign actors
Complexity. Multiplicity of hierarchies and asymmetrical powers	Hierarchy of power
Means of IR. Military force is an ultimate form of leverage in international relations.	Military force
Multiplicity of influences on FP. A variety of issues and problems on both domestic and international fronts	National security
Rational Optimism. The goal of IR is to provide for the long-term well-being of all communities.	Rational Skepticism

Constructivism—The view on international relations according to which state interests are “socially constructed,” i.e. based on cultural norms, social institutions, perceptions, and identities. It is process, not structure, which determines the manner in which states interact.

Three types of cultures in international relations

Source: Alex Wendt

Hobbesian (Thomas Hobbes)	States are enemies Power politics Zero-sum outcomes Self-interest and security
Lockean (John Locke)	States are adversaries Power and compromises Mutual restraint Treaties and regional security
Kantian (Immanuel Kant)	States are friends Cooperation Non-violence Collective security

Constructing the image of the U.S.’ role in international affairs

US is a beacon of peace	US is a warmonger
US defends freedom around the world	US suppresses freedom around the world
US fights against terrorism and radicalism	US is a terrorist state
US is the guarantor of stability in the world	US is the source of instability in the world

Many “faces” of Nationalism:

Love, loyalty, and devotion to a nation (or a nation-state), its culture, and people.

The belief that nations will benefit from acting independently rather than collectively, emphasizing national rather than international goals.

Aspirations for national independence in a country under foreign domination.

The doctrine that a national culture and interests are superior to any other.

International relations and nationalism

Sovereign	USA, Palestine, Poland, Quebec, Eritrea, etc.
Violent	Nazi Germany (external); nationalist movements (internal)
Isolationist	Communist Albania, N. Korea, Cuba, Japan, etc.
Cultural	Exemplified in attempts to protect own cultural heritage
Economic	Protectionist policies of Japan, France, GB, USA, China, etc.

Middle East: Western colonialism in the first half of the 20th century

Key developments	Brief Description
British and French occupation of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Palestine	Britain and France assumed the duty of "training and transforming" the region to secure: (1) eventual independence and self-government; (2) own economic and political dominance. Opposition: the General Syrian Congress; ethnic and religious groups.
Mandate for Lebanon	Received by France through the League of Nations in 1920. Creation of a separate state with a substantial Christian population.
Mandate for Syria	Received by France through the League of Nations in 1920. French troops took Damascus by force and partitioned the territory along ethnic and religious lines.
The British create the Kingdom of Iraq	The British received the mandate for Iraq in 1920. In June 1921, Emir Faisal, formerly the King of Syria, arrived (was brought) in Iraq and proclaimed King.
Mandate for Palestine	In 1920, under terms agreed at the San Remo Conference, the British government was given the mandate for Palestine (82% Muslim, 9% Christian, 9% Jewish). Creation of the Supreme Muslim Council.
The Jewish Agency	Balfour Declaration of 1917. In 1929, the Zionist Congress created the Jewish Agency in Palestine.
Transjordan	Creation of semi-autonomous state separate from Palestine but largely under the British rule.

Demographic Changes in Palestine**Source: Fisher & Ochsenwald, 1997**

	1919	1931	1939
Muslim Arabs	620,000	775,000	950,000
Jews	60,000	175,000	460,000
Christian Arabs	70,000	90,000	120,000

The Middle East Puzzle. GOVT 332. Eric Shiraev**How the problem was created: Decisions, Policies and Consequences**

Key events	Consequences
British Mandate (from the League of Nations in 1922)	1920-25: Four governments in Palestine (British, Jewish, Zionist, & Arab) Creation of Jewish Agency (1929)
Immigration policies	1920-1947: Increased Jewish immigration to the region
Land policies	Purchases by the National Fund (lands becoming inalienable property of the Jewish community)
Labor policies	Organized (1) Jewish (General Federation of Jewish Labor) and unorganized (2) Arab laborers

Struggle for and against sovereignty (1930s)	Jews were afraid to become a minority if a state is established; Arabs did not want a separate Jewish state; Peel report (1937) proposed a partition of Palestine
Institutions of self-government	Actively put together by the Jewish leaders; self-governance is not accomplished by Arabs due to internal and "external" disagreements
Creation of Israel (1947) and the First War	UN resolution supported by 181 members; on May 15 1948, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt and Jordan attacked Israel; lands allocated to Palestine were occupied by Israel or divided between Egypt and Jordan
The Suez War (1956)	The Suez Canal is nationalized by Egypt. Israel is out of Gaza and Sinai
The 1967 War	Israel captures <u>Sinai</u> from Egypt, <u>West Bank</u> and <u>Jerusalem</u> from Jordan, and the <u>Golan heights</u> from Syria
The 1973 War	Military stalemate; gradual re-establishment of diplomacy
The 1982 War in Lebanon	Israel expels PLO from Lebanon and attempts to establish there a "friendly" government
Palestinian Intifadah	Anti-Israeli uprisings in 1967-69 (civil disobedience), 1987, and the early 2000s.
New deals	Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza sector in 2005

A summary of theories dealing with decision-making in individual contexts

Source: Shiraev & Zubok, 2007

Theories	What they explain
Cognitive Consistency principle	The human mind operates so as to keep internal beliefs, opinions, and ideas consistent
Analogies and history lessons	Studies show that leaders frequently have to borrow heavily from domestic experience and from interpretations of events delivered to them by their advisers
Action templates	There are general expectations—formulated by leaders, policy advisers, political parties, and the media—about how foreign-policy decision-makers ought to react to certain international developments
Group environment	These are the norms and pressures of "team play," such as peer pressure, unwillingness to violate group unity, and collective sense of group identity. In international affairs, group decision-making may push great powers towards the struggle for control and power, instead of cooperation

Analogists—Politicians, foreign-policy experts, or journalists who evaluate and predict international relations on the basis of historical analogies.

Action templates are the general expectations or doctrines formulated by state leaders, policy advisers, political parties, and the media—about how react to certain international developments.

Featured Articles

Professor's comment: this article is an example of the analogy-bases assumptions in IR theory:

Pirates, Then and Now

How Piracy Was Defeated in the Past and Can Be Again

July/August 2009

Max Boot

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The world's attention was riveted in April 2009 when Somali pirates tried to seize the *Maersk Alabama*, a U.S. cargo vessel delivering relief supplies to Africa. Although the crew was able to fight off the intruders, the pirates seized the ship's skipper, Richard Phillips, and spent the next five days holding him hostage in a lifeboat bobbing in the Gulf of Aden, until U.S. Navy SEAL snipers killed the three remaining pirates and freed Phillips. There was a sigh of relief back in the United States, but it hardly meant an end to the pirate menace. In fact, within two days of Phillips' rescue, pirates had seized four more merchant ships and more hostages.

Piracy off the coast of East Africa is growing at an alarming rate, with 41 ships attacked in 2007, 122 in 2008, and 102 as of mid-May 2009. The more high-profile captures include a Saudi supertanker full of oil and a Ukrainian freighter loaded with tanks and other weapons. An estimated 19 ships and more than 300 crew members are still being held by pirates who are awaiting ransom payments from ship owners or insurers. Such fees have been estimated to total more than \$100 million in recent years, making piracy one of the most lucrative industries and pirates one of the biggest employers in Somalia, a country with a per capita GDP of \$600. Reported connections between the pirates and al Shabab -- "the youth," a Taliban-style group of Islamist extremists with ties to al Qaeda -- make the situation even more worrisome, notwithstanding some recent evidence of an Islamic backlash against the marauders in parts of Somalia.

THE SWARMING SEAS

Piracy was once a far more serious problem than it is today. In a history of piracy published in 1907, Colonel John Biddulph, a retired British army officer, wrote of the early 1700s:

From the moment of losing sight of the Lizard [the southernmost post in England] till the day of casting anchor in the port of destination an East India ship was never safe from attack, with the chance of slavery or a cruel death to crew and passengers in case of capture. From Finisterre to Cape Verd[e] the Moorish pirates made the seas unsafe, sometimes venturing into the mouth of the [English] channel to make a capture. Farther south, every watering-place on the African coast was infested by the English and French pirates who had their headquarters in the West Indies. From the Cape of Good Hope to the Head of the Persian Gulf, from Cape Comorin to Sumatra, every coast was beset by English, French, Dutch, Danish, Portuguese, Arab, Malay or other local pirates.

There was no peace on the ocean. The sea was a vast No Man's domain, where every man might take his prey.

Biddulph was not exaggerating. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, pirate communities flourished in and around the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Pirates were also prevalent in East Asia, with the seas around the Malay archipelago -- modern-day Indonesia and Malaysia -- infested for centuries by pirates such as the fierce Dyaks of Borneo and the Ilanun of the Philippines. Koxinga, a Chinese pirate and anti-Manchu rebel, at one point led as many as 100,000 men, and in 1661 he seized Taiwan from the Dutch. In the early eighteenth century, a confederation of 40,000 pirates based in Canton dominated the South China Sea, first under the leadership of Cheng Yih and then, after his death in 1807, under that of his widow, Cheng Shi, a former prostitute better known as Madam Cheng.

The North African corsair Barbarossa -- known as Khayr ad-Din in Arabic -- born to a Turkish father and a Greek mother on the Aegean island of Lesbos, was even more successful. In the early sixteenth century, he conquered Algiers and Tunis and, with the blessing of the Ottoman emperor, turned them into bases for sea raiding, which they would remain for the next three centuries. Although commonly called piracy, this activity was more properly known as "privateering," the term for state-sanctioned piracy. Morocco and Tripoli, the other states along the Barbary Coast, joined in this lucrative business, which involved hijacking ships from Christian nations, selling their cargoes, and either ransoming the passengers and crew back to their families or selling them into slavery.

In the early sixteenth century, Algiers alone was estimated to have a hundred sailing ships manned by thousands of sailors all engaged in privateering. With such a formidable force at its disposal, Algiers was able to hold 30,000 Christian captives (including, at one point, the Spanish novelist Miguel de Cervantes). These Muslim corsairs were matched by Christian adversaries from the Knights of St. John, who used bases first in Rhodes and then in Malta to plunder Muslim ships around the Mediterranean. Europeans also took many Muslims as slaves; Barbarossa's brother served for a time as a galley slave to the Knights of St. John.

Beginning in the 1690s, further south, not far from where today's Somali pirates lurk, the "Red Sea men" attacked not only ships belonging to the British, Dutch, and French East India Companies but also those belonging to wealthy Indians and other Asians. The ships targeted were often full of gold, cash, and jewels -- booty so rich that it drew aspiring pirates from as far away as New York. The most popular base for the freebooters was St. Mary's Island, off the coast of Madagascar. The historian Jan Rogozinski has called the Red Sea men "the most successful criminals in human history." He estimates that a single ship seized in 1695 by the Englishman Henry Every, "the King of Pirates," was worth at least \$200 million in modern currency.

The Caribbean Sea was not as lucrative a hunting ground for pirates, but it became better known to posterity because of Charles Johnson's 1724 book, *A General History of the Robberies and Murders of the Most Notorious Pirates*. More than any other source, *A General History* has forged the popular stereotype of the peg-legged and eye-patch-wearing pirate that has been mined over the years by artists from Robert Louis Stevenson to Johnny Depp. At their height in the early eighteenth century, the Caribbean pirates employed 2,400 men aboard 25 to 30 ships, many of which flew the Jolly Roger, with its infamous skull and crossbones. Other Caribbean pirate flags had images of cutlasses or bleeding hearts -- all designed to terrify potential victims into surrendering without a fight. The men who sailed under these outlaw emblems were based in the Bahamas, Hispaniola, Jamaica, Tortuga, the Virgin Islands, and other islands. The most successful captain, Bartholomew Roberts, or "Black Bart," was said to have looted 400 ships. The better-known Edward Teach, or "Blackbeard," who operated from a base in North Carolina, was a tyro by comparison.

Caribbean buccaneers not only raided ships but also looted Spanish settlements. In one of their most daring operations, the Welsh privateer Sir Henry Morgan sacked the well-defended city of Panama in 1671. Like the

Somali pirates of today, Morgan preferred to attack large ships from small boats, relying on shock to overpower the startled crews.

Morgan tried to stay on the right side of the law by obtaining sanction from the royal governor of Jamaica, which was then a British colony. However, because Morgan's last commission was signed after the conclusion of a peace treaty between England and Spain, he was arrested following the Panama raid and sent back to London. He was not imprisoned, though; in fact, the English government knighted him and returned him to Jamaica as lieutenant governor.

As Morgan's example makes clear, the first step needed in fighting piracy was to change official attitudes toward it. For many years, nations such as England and France had looked on piracy as either a minor nuisance, such as smuggling, or, when directed against their enemies, a potentially useful tactic. Before countries began to develop standing navies, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the primary way to wage a war at sea was to hand out "letters of marque and reprisal," authorizing privateers to attack enemy ships.

In the late sixteenth century, for example, a group of Dutch privateers known as the Sea Beggars helped liberate the Netherlands from Spanish rule. The French privateer Jean Bart was so effective in attacking Dutch shipping in the late seventeenth century that King Louis XIV ennobled him and gave him a captain's commission in the French navy. In the sixteenth century, English privateers such as Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter Raleigh, and Sir John Hawkins justified their attacks on Spanish shipping vessels by claiming they were fighting for the Crown. In many instances, their legal authority was dodgy. Their real protection came from sharing the rich proceeds of their journeys with Queen Elizabeth and her officials, which bought them high-level protection. In later years, countless lesser adventurers would emulate this strategy by greasing the palms of colonial officials in such ports as New York City and Port Royal, Jamaica.

But by the seventeenth century, when overseas trade became a primary source of the British Empire's wealth, the state's attitude began to change. Piracy and privateering became less tolerable to a nation that had much to lose from such attacks. Authorities began to remove corrupt officials who were in cahoots with the brigands. Governor Nicholas Trott of the Bahamas was deposed in 1696, followed the next year by Governor Benjamin Fletcher of New York.

Governments also began to hire privateers to root out pirates. Pirate hunters were tempted with generous bounties and told that they could keep all or part of whatever loot they recovered. This led to the capture of some outlaws, such as Blackbeard's associate Stede Bonnet, "the gentleman pirate," who was taken in 1718 after a bloody fight with a privateer ship commissioned by the governor of South Carolina. But some gamekeepers turned poachers. The most notorious "pirate hunter" was William Kidd, who in 1695 received a royal warrant to police the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Instead, Captain Kidd began seizing merchant ships for himself. He was ultimately returned to England and hanged.

OF MASTS AND MEN

Harsh penalties that were swiftly and regularly enforced were, not surprisingly, of central importance in suppressing robbery at sea. Pirates had long been regarded as *hostes humani generis*, "common enemies of mankind." States going back to the days of the Roman Empire reserved the right to capture and summarily execute pirates under what became known as "the doctrine of universal jurisdiction." But in practice, few pirates were executed on the spot, at least not in the modern age.

In the British Empire prior to 1700, pirates were dealt with by common-law courts, although not very effectively. Pirates, like modern mafia dons, could often bribe, intimidate, or otherwise suborn jurors in coastal towns, where many locals were connected to this illegal business. There was also a special Admiralty court in

London that could try pirates. But in order to be convicted, the pirates had to be transferred for trial to England along with all the necessary evidence and witnesses -- a cumbersome procedure in the age of sail.

In order to speed up prosecutions, in 1700 Parliament set up Vice-Admiralty courts that could convene abroad to try pirates. These courts were composed of seven "commissioners," who were drawn from the ranks of naval officers and colonial officials rather than from ordinary judges or jurors. Defendants were not given any legal representation. The historian Marcus Rediker estimates that between 1716 and 1726 -- the so-called golden age of piracy -- 400 to 600 Anglo-American pirates were executed under the terms of this system, or at least ten percent of all the pirates active at the time. Many were left to dangle in port as a "spectacle for the warning of others." Subsequent laws required the death penalty for those who cooperated with pirates and six months imprisonment for those who failed to defend their ships against pirates.

British justice may have been harsh, but it was not inflexible. A pirate could get off, for example, if he could convince the court that he had been coerced into a life of crime. Others were set free during periodic amnesties designed to thin the ranks of the marauders. In order to get pirates to give evidence against their accomplices, authorities relied on incentives, such as the possibility of leniency, along with rewards for informants.

Passing laws was a necessary step, but applying them was much harder, because pirates were notoriously elusive. A sine qua non for effective enforcement was the expansion of the British navy. In 1600, the British navy was virtually nonexistent, but by 1718, it had swelled to 124 ships, and by 1815, to 214. The lesser powers of the early nineteenth century had smaller but still substantial fleets: France had 80 ships, Spain 25, and the United States 17. In theory, all these ships could have been employed against *hostes humani generis*; in practice, other tasks, such as fighting one another, usually took precedence.

But gradually, countries began to commit more naval power to policing sea-lanes. The Royal Navy devoted only two ships to this task in the 1670s, but by 1700, it had 24 ships and 3,500 sailors stationed in strategically important outposts, such as Barbados, Cape Verde, Jamaica, Virginia, and West Africa. The Royal Navy also cooperated with other Western forces -- especially, in the years after the American Revolution, the U.S. Navy. After the War of 1812, British and U.S. forces worked closely together to battle pirates from the Caribbean to the East China Sea.

One of the more valuable tasks that naval forces could undertake was to convoy merchant ships. The Spanish took great care to safeguard the fleets transporting treasure back from the New World that sailed twice a year from the 1520s to the 1780s. Although a few were destroyed by bad weather or enemy attack, the only Spanish treasure fleet ever captured in more than 250 years of voyages was taken in 1628 by a Dutch naval squadron, not pirates. But the Spanish navy did not have enough warships to protect other Spanish merchant vessels, which became easy prey for English and French privateers. In 1579, Drake seized a Spanish ship sailing from Lima to Panama whose cargo was said to be worth \$18 million in today's money.

Some merchant ships were armed, but usually they did not try to resist attacks from pirate ships that had more cannons and more crew members. Most ship owners, then and now, have been loath to spend what it takes to defend their ships because they know this will cut into their profit margins -- and still not ward off determined attackers. In the end, the task of defense has been left to navies.

As naval forces took a more active role in the pirate wars, there were inevitably some fierce battles. Navy warships usually came out ahead in these confrontations because of the superior discipline and skill of their crews. On April 29, 1700, for example, the H.M.S. *Shoreham*, a 28-gun frigate, traded fire for ten hours with the 20-gun pirate vessel *La Paix*, crewed by French and Dutch sailors, which had taken refuge in Lynnhaven Bay, Virginia, after capturing several merchant ships. After killing many of the pirates onboard *La Paix*, the sailors on the *Shoreham* forced the survivors to surrender.

Although Blackbeard and Black Bart were both killed in battles with the Royal Navy, most pirates usually shied away from fights to the death. Instead, they preferred to hide ashore or in shallow coastal waters, where large warships could not follow them. Rooting them out required tactics such as those employed by the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean in the 1820s. The navy's Mosquito Fleet was based in Key West, Florida, and included oared barges that would, in the words of the fleet's commander, Captain David Porter, allow his men to pursue "freebooters and murderers" into their "haunts . . . among the roaring of breakers and the scream of sea-birds." Porter's men scoured the inlets and lagoons around Cuba and Puerto Rico, two well-known pirate enclaves. They managed to expel the outlaws but caused an international incident when they came ashore in Spanish-held Puerto Rico to demand an apology at gunpoint for insults leveled against one of their officers. Porter was court-martialed -- and it was precisely to avoid such incidents that the United Kingdom, the United States, and other powers hesitated to pursue pirates onto foreign shores. But doing so was essential if these marauders were to be caught.

Oftentimes, rooting out pirates meant risking not only an international incident but also full-scale war. In its early days of independence, the United States paid large tributes to the Barbary States in exchange for the safe passage of its ships. Under a treaty signed in 1795, Algiers alone received more than \$1 million in goods and cash, or one-sixth of the U.S. federal budget at the time. But the Barbary States were never satisfied. Eventually, U.S. President Thomas Jefferson decided that "nothing will stop the eternal increase of demands from these pirates but the presence of an armed force." So in 1801, he sent a U.S. naval squadron to the Mediterranean to wage war on Tripoli.

Over the next four years, the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps blockaded and bombarded Tripoli, engaged in numerous battles with Tripolitan ships, and even undertook an unsuccessful campaign to overthrow Tripoli's ruler and install a more pro-American regime. The worst disaster of the Barbary Wars was the capture of the U.S.S. *Philadelphia* in 1803; its luckless captain was William Bainbridge, the namesake of the U.S. Navy destroyer that recently rescued the *Maersk Alabama*. Following the dispatch of another U.S. naval squadron to the Mediterranean in 1815, the Barbary States agreed to stop attacking American ships and demanding tribute -- a concession they had previously made to Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands after those states waged their own Barbary wars in the seventeenth century.

The threat from Barbary pirates lingered until European colonists began to occupy North Africa, starting with the French conquest of Algeria in 1830. States realized that the surest way to create peace at sea was to impose the rule of law on the land where pirates hid. That still holds true today. Unfortunately, this has usually been a costly and difficult business, as the French learned when they faced an insurgency in Algeria led by the guerrilla leader Abd al-Qadir from 1832 to 1847. Similarly, on the other side of the globe, the threat from Malay pirates was not suppressed until the mid-nineteenth century, when the region fell under the sway of Europeans such as Sir James Brooke, "the White Rajah of Sarawak."

SURF AND TURF

Countries took a dozen or so steps to safeguard the seas during the pirate wars that stretched roughly from 1650 to 1850. These included changing public attitudes, hiring private pirate hunters, rooting out corruption, improving the administration of justice, offering pardons to pirates who voluntarily surrendered, increasing the number of naval ships dedicated to antipiracy duty, cooperating with other nations, convoying merchant ships, blockading and bombarding pirate ports, chasing pirates both at sea and on land, and, finally, occupying and dismantling pirate lairs.

What is striking and depressing about this list is how few of these measures are being implemented today. This is a reflection of the fact that most countries are not taking the problem of piracy all that seriously, notwithstanding some stern pronouncements from political leaders. The existence of other priorities, such as fighting terrorism or preparing for conventional wars, means that countries are reluctant to devote naval

resources to combating piracy. Meanwhile, shipping companies and their insurers are willing to pay ransoms that are said to average \$1 million per ship because they know that the odds of one of their vessels being seized are slim -- last year less than one-half of one percent of ships transiting the Horn of Africa were attacked, and most of those attacks were not successful. Ship owners would rather take their chances than arm crews or hire guards because they are afraid that this would only lead to an escalation of the violence. Similar concerns once led airlines to tell crews not to resist hijackers. This approach changed after 9/11, and one hopes it will not take a similar disaster at sea for ship owners to reconsider their policies.

Left unchallenged, piracy is spiraling out of control, and now threatens the sea-lanes that transport almost half the world's cargo, including one-third of Europe's oil supplies. In addition, many of the proceeds from this modern-day piracy may wind up underwriting an extreme Islamist movement. This collective inaction is another example of "the tragedy of the commons," in which decisions to pursue individual self-interest result in a public disaster -- not least for the hundreds of sailors held hostage. To make ship owners and insurers take the problem more seriously, the U.S. government could adopt a proposal such as the one made by the retired army officer Ralph Peters, who suggested that any company that pays off pirates should be denied the right to do business in the United States.

The United States and its allies should also increase the number of warships stationed off the Horn of Africa. Naval forces from the United States and more than 20 other countries operate under the aegis of Combined Task Force 151, currently commanded by a Turkish admiral. But although there are as many as 30 warships in the region, most are devoted to antiterrorist missions or other tasks, often leaving no more than 14 warships available for combating pirates. This is a reflection of the shameful decline in the size of Western fleets: the Royal Navy is down to fewer than 100 ships, the U.S. Navy, to fewer than 300, and both will continue to shrink based on current trends. It is incumbent on the United Kingdom and the United States, which for centuries have taken the lead in maritime enforcement, to buy more warships, especially small vessels along the lines of the U.S. Navy's Littoral Combat Ship, which is designed to operate in coastal waters.

In the meantime, these meager national forces could be supplemented by private security companies that could patrol the seas with their own ships or station guards aboard merchant ships -- an option suggested by Claude Berube, of the U.S. Naval Academy, in an article provocatively entitled "Blackwaters for the Blue Waters." Reviving letters of marque is another possible option that is authorized by the U.S. Constitution (Article 1, Section 8). But doing so could cause considerably more problems, because it would be hard to control latter-day Captain Kidds.

Regardless of however many additional warships are sent, it is important that they be allowed to use more effective tactics than currently permitted by their political masters. Most of the naval ships now stationed off the Horn of Africa are not convoying merchant vessels, hunting down pirate ships, or bombarding pirate lairs. Instead, all they are authorized to do is float around in an attempt to deter pirates from striking and respond to distress calls when they do strike. These are fools' errands when undertaken by a dozen or so ships scattered across an area four times the size of Texas. The pirates are equipped with satellite phones and GPS devices and are sophisticated enough to monitor naval movements and strike when and where patrollers are absent.

The problem is twofold: a lack of legal authority and a lack of will to enforce what authority does exist. The UN Security Council has passed a series of Chapter 7 resolutions -- five last year alone -- that authorize military forces to pursue pirates into Somalia's territorial waters and ashore, if necessary. In theory, this gives the United States the right to carry out air strikes and amphibious raids on pirate lairs and to sink pirate ships. But as of this writing, such strikes have not happened -- after 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in a clash with Somali militiamen in 1993, U.S. policymakers are reluctant to send troops back to the region. The only time President Barack Obama has authorized the use of lethal force was when Captain Phillips' life was judged to be in danger.

U.S. and other naval forces stationed off East Africa have not been given the kind of robust rules of engagement that are used in war zones such as Iraq. There, at least until the implementation of the new status-of-forces agreement signed in late 2008, U.S. troops could shoot armed enemy combatants on sight when they felt threatened and detain those deemed a security risk, even if there was not sufficient evidence to convict them of a crime. In contrast, there is not much a U.S. Navy ship can do if it encounters a "fishing trawler" full of armed young men off the coast of Somalia, because under current international rules, these likely pirates are treated as civilians, not combatants, and there is no prohibition against sailors toting guns.

In fact, this very scenario has happened several times. To take only one example, according to *The New York Times*, in September 2008, "a Danish warship captured 10 men suspected of being pirates cruising around the Gulf of Aden with rocket-propelled grenades and a long ladder. But after holding the suspects for nearly a week, the Danes concluded that they did not have jurisdiction to prosecute, so they dumped the pirates on a beach, minus their guns."

As this incident indicates, naval forces are severely hindered by the lack of an effective mechanism for dealing with captured pirates. Under legal doctrines dating back to the Roman Empire, any state can try suspected pirates in its own court system, even if they did not attack its own ships. But as Eugene Kontorovich, a law professor at Northwestern University, notes in an upcoming article in the *California Law Review*, legal obstacles to effective prosecution have emerged in recent years from "international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions, a variety of human rights treaties, international refugee law, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and other sources." The result is that Western nations no longer want to try pirates themselves. In an extreme example of this kind of reticence, the British Foreign Office has expressed concern that captured pirates might demand asylum or complain of having their human rights violated.

As a stopgap, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States have entered into agreements with Kenya -- which, in addition to being next to Somalia, is a functioning state with an interest in keeping shipping lanes open -- to turn over suspected pirates to Kenya's justice system. Although this has resulted in some convictions, the Kenyan courts lack the resources to deal with many more malefactors. Other suspected pirates, such as the ten men detained by the Danish navy last year or the nine men seized by the U.S. Navy in February, are simply released due to a lack of "ironclad" evidence. "Somali pirates to date have suffered few consequences, even when they were apprehended," noted Rear Admiral William Baumgartner, of the U.S. Coast Guard.

This question of how to try and process pirates is closely related to the problem of how to deal with terrorists, another species of international outlaw. With the detention policies of former U.S. President George W. Bush generating endless adverse publicity, neither the Obama administration nor any other Western government is eager to hold suspected pirates or terrorists. "No one wants a Guantánamo on the sea," the German defense minister, Franz Josef Jung, said last year. But nor does anyone want to simply set predators loose to strike again. One option would be to negotiate an international agreement that would allow the processing and detention of pirates and terrorists through legal venues such as the International Criminal Court or a specially created UN tribunal. Failing that, the United States and other states should use their national courts to try pirates, much as a U.S. court in New York is now hearing the case of one of the pirates who attacked the *Maersk Alabama*. Under laws that date back to the nineteenth century, U.S. courts have the authority to try pirates even if they did not attack U.S. vessels.

The entire issue, at least as far as Somali pirates are concerned, could be made largely superfluous if only Somalia had a responsible government capable of policing its own territory. Given that country's long history of chaos, the only sure way to achieve this goal would be through the imposition of an international regency similar to the UN administration in Kosovo. But since U.S. and UN forces were chased ignominiously out of Mogadishu in the early 1990s, there is scant chance they will be willing to return to Somalia and risk another fight.

The odds that Somali piracy will disappear without a robust response from maritime nations are equally remote. Even if bringing law and order to Somalia is beyond the will of the international community, it still should be possible to curb the pirate menace through military and legal initiatives that stop short of actual occupation. All that is required is to apply the lessons of history. If previous generations could defeat the Barbary corsairs, the Caribbean buccaneers, and the Red Sea men, surely this generation can defeat the ragtag sea robbers of Somalia.

More than 20 countries, including China, France, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have responded by sending naval forces to the waters off East Africa. But with an average of only 14 warships focused on combating piracy in the region at any one time, they have been unable to effectively police the more than one million square miles of ocean that is transited by over 33,000 cargo vessels every year. It helps to look at previous plagues of piracy and how they were defeated to understand why these efforts fall short and what type of tactics might prove more effective.

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Professor's comments: this is a very interesting and strong piece on the impact of women on international relations. The article's main idea: greater female political participation would bring significant rewards.

Let Women Rule
By Swanee Hunt

From *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2007

Summary: Although women have made large strides professionally over the last century, politics remains a man's world. Significant barriers stand in the way of more women assuming positions of political leadership -- not least women's own attitudes. If serious efforts are not made to break down these barriers, the world will miss out on the benefits that women can bring to policymaking.

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MISSING OUT

Women have made significant strides in most societies over the last century, but the trend line has not been straight. In recent interviews with hundreds of female leaders in over 30 countries, I have discovered that where women have taken leadership roles, it has been as social reformers and entrepreneurs, not as politicians or government officials. This is unfortunate, because the world needs women's perspectives and particular talents in top positions. In 1998, Francis Fukuyama wrote in *Foreign Affairs* that women's political leadership would bring about a more cooperative and less conflict-prone world ("Women and the Evolution of World Politics," September/October 1998). That promise has yet to be fulfilled.

Granted, a few women are breaking through traditional barriers and becoming presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, and legislators. But even as the media spotlight falls on the 11 female heads of government

around the world, another significant fact goes unreported: most of the best and the brightest women eschew politics. Women are much more likely to wield influence from a nongovernmental organization (NGO) than from public office.

Women are still severely underrepresented in governments worldwide. A recent World Economic Forum report covering 115 countries notes that women have closed over 90 percent of the gender gap in education and in health but only 15 percent of it when it comes to political empowerment at the highest levels. Although 97 countries have some sort of gender quota system for government positions, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, an organization that fosters exchange among parliaments, women fill only 17 percent of parliamentary seats worldwide and 14 percent of ministerial-level positions -- and most of those are related to family, youth, the disabled, and the elderly. At NGOs, the story is very different: women are consistently overrepresented at the top levels.

This pattern also holds for the United States, where 16 of 100 members of the Senate and 71 of 435 members of the House of Representatives are women. The United States ranks 68 out of 189 countries, behind a dozen in Latin America, in terms of the number of women in the legislature. Those low numbers are consistent with Capitol Hill's historic antipathy toward females. Women were denied the vote for 133 years, refused an equal rights amendment, and shut out of government-funded health research for decades. At the same time, American women have gravitated en masse toward NGOs, where they have found fewer barriers to leadership. The 230 NGOs in the National Council of Women's Organizations represent ten million American women, and women lead many of the country's largest philanthropic organizations, including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Ford Foundation. As for academia, Harvard, MIT, and Princeton currently have women at the helm.

Most other countries follow a similar pattern. The number of NGOs in the former Soviet republics grew exponentially after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and women formed the backbone of this new civil society, but the percentage of women in eastern European parliaments plummeted. In Lithuania, that percentage declined from approximately 33 percent during the communist era to 17.5 percent in 1997 and 10.6 percent in 2004. According to a group of journalists in Kyrgyzstan, women head 90 percent of NGOs but hold not a single seat in parliament, even though they made up 33 percent of the legislature at the end of the Soviet era. In China, the Communist Party-controlled All-China Women's Federation functions much as an NGO does, engaging women across the country on community issues, but despite the government's claims of equality, Chinese women have rarely held positions of political power. Likewise, in South Korea, women run some 80 percent of the country's NGOs but occupy less than 14 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. The story is the same in Africa. According to Robert Rotberg, director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, "African women, who traditionally do the hard work of cultivation and all of the family rearing, also nurture NGOs and motivate civic initiatives. But they are widely expected to leave politics -- and corruption and conflict -- to men."

Women may thrive in NGOs. The world, however, needs them to take that experience into the political sphere. As the Sierra Leonean activist and former presidential candidate Zainab Bangura points out, "The real power isn't in civil society; it's in policymaking."

A WOMAN'S VIEW

Greater female political participation would bring significant rewards. Research sponsored by the World Bank has shown that countries with a high number of women in parliament enjoy lower levels of corruption. Another World Bank-sponsored study concludes that women are less likely to be involved in bribery and that corruption is less severe where women make up a large share of senior government officials as well as the labor force. A survey of research by Rachel Croson, of the Wharton School, and Uri Gneezy, of the University of California, San Diego, similarly concluded that women are more trustworthy than men. Consider Nigeria. The watchdog group Transparency International ranked it as the most corrupt country in the world in 2003. But that year,

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala left her job as a vice president at the World Bank to become the country's finance minister, and by 2005 Transparency International was hailing Nigeria as one of 21 most improved states. Change came thanks to the indictment of corrupt officials, as well as to reform in banking, insurance, the foreign exchange market, pensions, and income taxation. Similarly, in Liberia, international policymakers have been heartened to see President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf prioritize the eradication of corruption. Knowing that foreign investment would flow only after a crackdown on the plundering culture of her predecessors, Johnson-Sirleaf fired the entire Finance Ministry staff and brought in women for the positions of finance minister, chief of police, commerce minister, and justice minister, among others.

Electing and appointing women to positions of political leadership turns out to be good for the broader economy as well. There is a correlation between women holding political office and the overall economic competitiveness of a nation. Augusto Lopez-Claros, chief economist and director of the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Network, argues that "the Nordic countries seem to have understood the economic incentive behind empowering women: countries that do not fully capitalize on one-half of their human resources are clearly undermining their competitive potential." The high percentage of women in parliament in countries such as Rwanda (almost 49 percent of members in the lower house), Costa Rica (40 percent), and Mozambique (35 percent) suggests that it is not simply a nation's affluence that causes more women to assume leadership positions. If that were the case, the relatively prosperous United States should be in the top ranks of countries sending women to Congress instead of lagging behind countries such as El Salvador, Nepal, and Tajikistan.

In 2000, an Inter-Parliamentary Union poll of 187 female politicians in 65 countries found that 80 percent of the respondents believed that increased representation of women renews public trust in government, which in turn helps economic welfare. The politicians cited examples from countries as varied as El Salvador, Ethiopia, New Zealand, and Russia in which political activism by women led to "tangible improvements" in social services, the environment, the safety of women and children, and gender equality.

Worldwide, female legislators as a group tend to concentrate on helping marginalized citizens. In the United States, for example, Democratic and moderate Republican congresswomen are more likely than men to focus on socially conscious legislation. Perhaps female politicians take such concerns to heart because they have often honed their skills in the NGO arena. Chilean President Michelle Bachelet, for instance, returned from exile in 1979 to work with children of people who were tortured or who disappeared during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. South Korean Prime Minister Han Myeong Sook was a social activist (and political prisoner) during her country's military dictatorship.

The lessons women learn while leading civil society may also explain why they have "higher moral or ethical standards than their male counterparts," according to the International NGO Training and Research Center. Hannah Riley Bowles, professor of public policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, found that when negotiating for jobs, American women asked for 15 percent less than men did, but when negotiating on behalf of others, women's demands increased substantially. (No such difference was found among male negotiators.) Carrying that tendency into the political sphere, "women may hold back when promoting their own candidacy or securing the resources they need to rise to the fore," argues Bowles. But they can be "fabulous advocates for their constituents."

Given these qualities, it is no surprise that women's involvement in political negotiations tends to solidify conflict resolution. "If we put women in leadership, they have a degree of tolerance, an understanding that allows them to persist even when things seem to be very bad," notes Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, a South African clinical psychologist who worked in grass-roots NGOs during apartheid and helped establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Unlike men, she continues, "women have the power and emotional inclination to hold onto hope when it comes to negotiating with former enemies." As documented by the Initiative for

Inclusive Security, in numerous settings, women have joined forces across party lines to shape peace agreements, sponsor legislation, and influence the drafting of constitutions.

They also come to the table with a different perspective on conflict resolution. Women are more likely to adopt a broad definition of security that includes key social and economic issues that would otherwise be ignored, such as safe food and clean water and protection from gender-based violence. This sentiment was expressed to me by South Korea's Song Young Sun, the National Assembly's military watchdog. Most of the men she serves with define security as protecting South Korea's territory against North Korea, she said; she believes that security considerations should also include "everything from economics to culture, environment, health, and food."

A MAN'S WORLD

If having women wield political power is so beneficial, why are there not more female leaders? A fundamental reason is that women themselves are not eager or willing to stand for political office. Women view politics as a dirty game, and their loftier standards may keep them away from the grit and grind of it. More than 200 public officials and NGO leaders throughout Kyrgyzstan responded to a 2004 United Nations Development Program poll by saying women would bring transparency, "a strong sense of responsibility," and "fair attitudes" to politics. But Nurgul Djanaeva, who heads a coalition of 88 Kyrgyz women's groups, bemoaned the situation: "The only way for me to feed my family, while working in government, is to be corrupt, so I'd rather work for an NGO and have a living wage."

It does not help that politics has traditionally been a man's world, and that many men -- and some women -- want to keep it that way. A woman may be considered "too soft" for political leadership -- or "unfeminine" if she runs. Often, however, it is women themselves who doubt their own leadership abilities. According to the 2000 World Values Survey, women comprised 21 percent of respondents in Chile and 45 percent of respondents in Mexico who agreed strongly with the statement that men make better political leaders than women do. This distinct lack of self-assurance persists across cultures. According to research by the political scientists Richard Lawless and Jennifer Fox, authors of *It Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don't Run for Office*, American women were twice as likely as men to describe themselves as "not at all qualified to run for office," even when their credentials were equivalent. Only 25 percent of the women saw themselves as likely or very likely winners, compared with 37 percent of the men.

The traditional role society expects women to play does not spur them on to political leadership either. Reconciling political life with family commitments was the primary concern of the female politicians surveyed in 2000 by the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Women usually believe that their obligations to family members -- including parents and in-laws -- as the primary caregiver are incompatible with holding public office. Rebeca Grynspan, former vice president of Costa Rica, voices the dilemma: "Society doesn't provide conditions under which we can do our jobs with tranquility and leave our children home with peace of mind, even if we can count on stable, supportive partners." The pressures for women to stay home and tend to their families are compounded by conservative religious doctrines. A fundamentalist interpretation of Islam threatens women's nascent political hopes in countries such as Kuwait, where women gained the right to vote and run for office in the 2006 elections but did not win any parliamentary seats. Similarly, Afghanistan and Iraq, where new constitutions reserve a quarter of parliamentary seats for women, are in danger of backsliding into a collision with resurgent extremism. In the West, the Catholic Church in such countries as Croatia urges women to focus on family rather than public life. Likewise, most women in U.S. politics find their views incompatible with the religious right: in 2004, only two of the 14 female senators, compared with 48 of the 86 male senators, voted consistently with the Christian Coalition.

Even when women want to run for political office, they encounter roadblocks. In most countries, male political party gatekeepers determine candidate lists, and the ordering of candidates on the lists is a fundamental factor in

determining who goes to parliament. It takes more than affirmative-action measures, such as quotas or reserved seats, to ensure women's places on those lists; it takes parties' will. According to the Harvard political scientist Pippa Norris, who analyzed the 1997 British elections, the Labour Party showed rare resolve in setting aside for women half of the seats from which members of parliament were retiring and half of those considered "most winnable." That move doubled the total percentage of women in parliament from 9.2 to 18.2 percent of all seats. More typical, however, is the complaint of a Bosnian politician who told me wryly that her place on her party's candidate list dropped precipitously, thanks to backroom hacks and men muscling their way to the top.

Money constitutes another barrier for women. Coming up with fees to file as a candidate or run a campaign can be daunting. Few countries have emulated the creation of organizations such as EMILY's List ("EMILY" stands for "Early Money Is Like Yeast"), which raises contributions across the United States for Democratic pro-choice women.

The financial squeeze can be further compounded by the threat of physical harm. According to Phoebe Asiyo, a prominent Kenyan member of parliament for more than a quarter century, the greatest expense for women running for parliament in Kenya is around-the-clock security, which is necessary because of the danger of rape, a common intimidation tactic. Mary Okumu, a Stanford-educated Kenyan public health expert, was beaten up when she stood for election in 2002. Okumu says that she and other candidates routinely carried concealed knives and wore two sets of tights under their dresses in order to buy more time to scream during an attempted rape. Male opponents were also at risk of physical attack, but Okumu says that "for women political aspirants the violence also includes foul verbal abuse, beatings, abduction, and death threats."

Given prevailing social norms and the numerous barriers to entry to the political arena, as well as women's own perception of politics as a dirty game, it is unsurprising that many women turn away from elected office, believing that they have a better chance of achieving results in the NGO realm. In 1991, as a child, Ala Noori Talabani fled on foot from Saddam Hussein's army. Fourteen years later, she was elected to the interim Iraqi National Assembly. She seemed a model legislator -- a well-educated, articulate former diplomat equally comfortable among villagers in Kirkuk, politicians in Baghdad, and policy analysts in Washington. Yet in 2006, she left politics in frustration to work with an NGO so that she could focus on the problems she cares about most: honor killings, domestic violence, and rape.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

The forces excluding women from political leadership are so strong that only a serious and comprehensive effort can bring about change. Fortunately, governments, foreign-aid organizations, think tanks, and academic institutions can stimulate both the supply of and the demand for women in the political arena.

At the most basic level, national governments should implement "family-friendly" policies, including straightforward measures such as easier access to daycare, flexible office hours, and limits to evening meetings. But in some countries, to be effective, policies will have to be designed according to more progressive interpretations of religious doctrine regarding gender roles. In 2004, Moroccan King Muhammad VI personally backed a new version of family law that was compatible with sharia and that gave women equal rights. His support of gender-sensitive legislation also increased women's political representation (from two in 2001 to 35 in 2002 of the 325 seats in parliament's lower house) and made Morocco one of the most socially progressive countries in the Muslim world. In May 2006, thanks to another of the king's initiatives, the first class of 50 female imams graduated from an academy in Rabat. They are expected to do everything male imams do except lead Friday prayers in a mosque.

NGOs and governments have an important role to play in equipping women with the confidence and skills necessary to run for office. Grass-roots programs could help recruit and train women across the political spectrum. The Cambodian organization Women for Prosperity, for instance, has prepared more than 5,500

female candidates for elections in Cambodia. Embassies abroad could encourage established female officials to mentor new candidates, learning from the Forum of Rwandan Women Parliamentarians. In 2006, Rwanda's female parliamentarians returned to their districts to rally women to run for local office, increasing the proportion of female mayors and deputy mayors in the country from 24 to 44 percent in one election. Outsiders ought to boost the profile of Liberia's Johnson-Sirleaf, the only elected African female head of state, who recently urged female officeholders, "Don't stop with parliament. Join me. I'm lonely." The Initiative for Inclusive Security, which has brokered relationships between hundreds of female leaders in conflict regions and thousands of policymakers, is a creative and strong model of an external player working to encourage women's political participation. And governments should look to replicate innovative political party reforms that ensure gender equality, such as those promoted by Michal Yudin's group in Israel -- WE (Women's Electoral) Power -- which has pressured Knesset members to increase funding for parties that exceed the quota for women's participation.

Supporting transparent and equitable campaign-finance rules would also help women in the political arena. Women told me that when they have to choose between their children's school fees and their own campaign, their children win. Government campaign subsidies spread across political parties help level the field. Governments should go further by rewarding parties that boost the representation of women on their candidate lists and penalizing those that do not.

Female politicians also need to be protected. In Afghanistan, where women running for parliament in 2005 were attacked, local and international organizations asked governors, chiefs of police, tribal elders, and other community leaders to provide security details. At least one candidate who reported threats had police protection 24 hours a day. Security measures reassured women that state and community leaders backed their right to engage in politics.

Finally, and most important, governments ought to support quotas for women at all levels of government. In systems with proportional representation, "zippering," requiring that a woman be in every second or third slot on a ballot, has helped raise women's numbers; still, women rarely appear in the top two ballot slots. Although quotas may initially result in female members of parliament being taken less seriously, the upside far outweighs the downside, since quotas propel women into politics. Sixteen of the 19 countries -- including Cuba, Iceland, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden -- that have parliaments in which at least 30 percent of the members are women have implemented either legislative or party quotas.

LESS SWAGGER, MORE SWAY

Women's community-based wisdom, fresh ideas, and commitment to the social good may be the best news in domestic policy today. They have much to contribute to decisions regarding the environment, security, health care, finance, and education. In foreign policy as well, the world could use more sway and less swagger.

A critical mass of female leaders will change norms; that may be why President Bachelet appointed ten women alongside the ten men in her cabinet. Of course, there are exceptions, but generally speaking, stereotypical "feminine" qualities (such as the tendency to nurture, compromise, and collaborate) have been confirmed by social science research. The world needs those traits. With so many intractable conflicts, conventional strategies -- economic sanctions, boycotts, or military intervention -- have clearly proved inadequate. Women's voices would provide a call from arms.

None of these benefits to domestic and foreign policy, however, will be realized if just a few women reach positions of leadership. The few women who now make it to the top of a predominantly male hierarchy, and who do not come out of a women's movement, usually have attributes more similar to those of most men. Indira Gandhi, Margaret Thatcher, and Golda Meir had more "masculine" qualities than many of the men they bested, and they pushed little of the social agenda commonly of interest to women in politics. General wisdom about

critical mass would predict that approximately 30 percent of officeholders have to be female for a significant effect to be felt on policy. As Anita Gradin remarked to me about her experience as a member of Sweden's parliament, the same group of women who were once in a small minority in the legislature talked, acted, and voted differently when their proportion increased significantly.

The more women shift from civil society into government, the more political culture will change for the better, and the more other women will follow. Advocates of women's leadership need to stop their handwringing over whether gender differences exist and appreciate the advantages women have over men's brawny style of governance, whether because of biology, social roles, or a cascading combination of the two. In the meantime, however, they will have to put up with some paternalistic responses, such as the one I received from a colonel at the Pentagon shortly after the United States' "shock and awe" attack on Iraq in 2003. When I urged him to broaden his search for the future leaders of Iraq, which had yielded hundreds of men and only seven women, he responded, "Ambassador Hunt, we'll address women's issues after we get the place secure." I wondered what "women's issues" he meant. I was talking about security.